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THE SMALL-IS-VERY-SMALL PRINCIPLE
ALBERT VISSER
Abstract. The central result of this paper is the small-is-very-small principle
for restricted sequential theories. The principle says roughly that whenever the
given theory shows that a property has a small witness, i.e. a witness in every
definable cut, then it shows that the property has a very small witness: i.e. a
witness below a given standard number.
We draw various consequences from the central result. For example (in
rough formulations): (i) Every restricted, recursively enumerable sequential
theory has a finitely axiomatized extension that is conservative w.r.t. formulas
of complexity ≤ n. (ii) Every sequential model has, for any n, an extension
that is elementary for formulas of complexity ≤ n, in which the intersection
of all definable cuts is the natural numbers. (iii) We have reflection for Σ02-
sentences with sufficiently small witness in any consistent restricted theory
U . (iv) Suppose U is recursively enumerable and sequential. Suppose further
that every recursively enumerable and sequential V that locally inteprets U ,
globally interprets U . Then, U is mutually globally interpretable with a finitely
axiomatized sequential theory.
The paper contains some careful groundwork developing partial satisfaction
predicates in sequential theories for the complexity measure depth of quantifier
alternations.
1. Introduction
Some proofs are like hollyhocks. If you are nice to them they give different flow-
ers every year. This paper is about one such proof. I discovered it when searching
for alternative, more syntactic, proofs of certain theorems by Harvey Friedman (dis-
cussed in [Smo85]) and by Jan Kraj´ıcˇek (see [Kra87]). The relevant theorem due
to Harvey Friedman tells us that, if a finitely axiomatized, sequential, consistent
theory A interprets a recursively enumerable theory U , then A interprets U faith-
fully. Kraj´ıcˇek’s theorem tells us that a finitely axiomatized, sequential, consistent
theory cannot prove its own inconsistency on arbitrarily small cuts. There is a close
connection between these two theorems.
The quest for a syntactic proof succeeded and the results were reported in [Vis93].
One advantage of having such a syntactic proof is clearly that it can be ‘internalized’
in the theories we study. I returned to the argument in a later paper [Vis05], which
contains improvements and, above all, a better theoretical framework. In my papers
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[Vis14a] and [Vis15], the argument is employed to prove results about provability
logic and about degrees of interpretability, respectively.
The syntactic argument in question is a Rosser-style argument or, more specifi-
cally, a Friedman-Goldfarb-Harrington-style argument. It has all the mystery of a
Rosser argument: even if every step is completely clear, it still retains a feeling of
magic trickery.
1.1. Contents of the Paper. In the present paper, we will obtain more informa-
tion from the Friedman-Goldfarb-Harrington-style argument discussed above. In
previous work, the basic conclusion of the argument is that, given a consistent,
finitely axiomatized, sequential theory A, there is an interpretation M of the basic
arithmetic S12 in A that is Σ
0
1-sound. In the present paper, we extend our scope
from finitely axiomatized sequential theories to restricted sequential theories —this
means that we consider theories with axioms of complexity below a fixed finite
bound. Secondly, we replace the Σ01-soundness by the more general small-is-very-
small principle (SIVS).
The improved results have a number of consequences. In Section 4, we show
that, for any n, every consistent, restricted, recursively enumerable, sequential
theory has a finitely axiomatized extension that is conservative w.r.t. formulas
of complexity ≤ n. In Section 5, we show that, for any n, every sequential model
has an elementary extension w.r.t. formulas of of complexity ≤ n, such that the
intersection of all definable cuts consists of the standard numbers. In Section 6,
we indicate how results concerning Σ02-soundness can be derived from our main
theorem. Finally, in Section 7, we prove a result in the structure of the combined
degrees of local and global interpretability of recursively enumerable, sequential
theories. We show that if a local degree contains a minimal global degree, then this
global degree contains a finitely axiomatized theory. Thus, finite axiomatizability
has a natural characterization, modulo global interpretability, in terms of the double
degree structure.1
Section 2 provides the necessary elementary facts. Unlike similar sections in other
papers of mine, this section also contains something new. In [Vis93], I provided
groundwork for the development of partial satisfaction predicates for the complexity
measure depth of quantifier alternations. Our present Subsection 2.3 gives a much
better treatment of the complexity measure than the one in [Vis93]. Subsection 2.5
develops the facts about sequential theories and partial satisfaction predicates in
greater detail than previously available in the literature. Moreover, we provide
careful estimates of the complexities yielded by the various constructions. On the
one hand, these subsections contain ‘what we already knew’, on the other hand, as
I found, even if you already know how things go, it can still be quite a puzzle to
get all nuts and bolts at the precise places where they have to go. Of course, the
present treatment is still not fully explicit, but we are further on the road.
Section 3 contains the central result of the paper. As the reader will see, after all
is said and done, the central argument is amazingly simple. The work is in creating
the setting in which the result can be comfortably stated.
1I presented this result in a lecture for the Moscow Symposium on Logic, Algebra and Com-
putation in 2006. However, I was not able to write down the proof, since I lacked the necessary
groundwork on partial satisfaction. This groundwork is provided in Section 2 of the present paper.
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2. Basic Notions and Facts
In the present section, we provide the basics needed for the rest of the paper. As
pointed out in the introduction the development of partial satisfaction predicates is
done in more detail here than elsewhere. For this reason this section may also turn
out to be useful for subsequent work. Of course, the reader who wants to get on
quickly to more exciting stuff could briefly look over the relevant subsections and,
if needed, return to them later.
2.1. Theories. In this paper we will study theories with finite signature. In most of
our papers, theories are intensional objects equipped with a formula representing
the axiom set. In the present paper, to the contrary, a theory is just a set of
sentences of the given signature closed under deduction. This is because most of
the results in the paper are extensional.
Also we do not have any constraints on the complexity of the axiom set of
the theory. If a theory is finitely axiomatizable, par abus de langage, we use the
variables like A and B for it, making the letters do double work: they both stand
for the theory and for a single axiom.
When we diverge from our general format this will always be explicitly men-
tioned.
In the paper, we will meet many concrete theories, to wit AS, PA−, EA, PRA, PA.
We refer the reader to the textbooks [HP93] and [Kay91] for an introduction to
these theories.
2.2. Translations and Interpretations. We present the notion of m-dimensi-
onal interpretation without parameters. There are two extensions of this notion:
we can consider piecewise interpretations and we can add parameters. We will
give some details on parameters in Appendix A. We will not describe piecewise
interpretations here.
Consider two signatures Σ and Θ. An m-dimensional translation τ : Σ → Θ
is a quadruple 〈Σ, δ,F ,Θ〉, where δ(v0, . . . , vm−1) is a Θ-formula and where, for
any n-ary predicate P of Σ, F(P ) is a formula A(~v0, . . . , ~vn−1) in the language
of signature Θ, where ~vi = vi0, . . . , vi(m−1). Both in the case of δ and A all free
variables are among the variables shown. Moreover, if i 6= j or k 6= ℓ, then vik is
syntactically different from vjℓ.
We demand that we have ⊢ F(P )(~v0, . . . , ~vn−1) →
∧
i<n δ(~vi). Here ⊢ is prov-
ability in predicate logic. This demand is inessential, but it is convenient to have.
We define Bτ as follows:
• (P (x0, . . . , xn−1))τ := F(P )(~x0, . . . , ~xn−1).
• (·)τ commutes with the propositional connectives.
• (∀xA)τ := ∀~x (δ(~x )→ Aτ ).
• (∃xA)τ := ∃~x (δ(~x ) ∧ Aτ ).
There are two worries about this definition. First, what variables ~xi on the side
of the translation Aτ correspond with xi in the original formula A? The second
worry is that substitution of variables in δ and F(P ) may cause variable-clashes.
These worries are never important in practice: we choose ‘suitable’ sequences ~x to
correspond to variables x, and we avoid clashes by α-conversion. However, if we
want to give precise definitions of translations and, for example, of composition of
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translations, these problems come into play. The problems are clearly solvable in a
systematic way, but this endeavor is beyond the scope of this paper.
We allow the identity predicate to be translated to a formula that is not identity.
A translation τ is direct, if it is one-dimensional and if δτ (x) := (x = x) and if it
translates identity to identity.
There are several important operations on translations.
• idΣ is the identity translation. We take δidΣ(v) := v = v and F(P ) := P (~v ).
• We can compose translations. Suppose τ : Σ → Θ and ν : Θ → Λ. Then
ν ◦ τ or τν is a translation from Σ to Λ. We define:
– δτν(~v0, . . . , ~vmτ−1) :=
∧
i<mτ
δν(~vi) ∧ (δτ (v0, . . . , vmτ−1))
ν .
– Pτν(~v0,0, . . . , ~v0,mτ−1, . . . ~vn−1,0, . . . , ~vn−1,mτ−1) :=∧
i<n,j<mτ
δν(~vi,j) ∧ (P (v0, . . . , vn−1)τ )ν .
• Let τ, ν : Σ → Θ and let A be a sentence of signature Θ. We define
the disjunctive translation σ := τ〈A〉ν : Σ → Θ as follows. We take
mσ := max(mτ ,mν). We write ~v ↾ n, for the restriction of ~v to the first n
variables, where n ≤ length(~v).
– δσ(~v) := (A ∧ δτ (~v ↾ mτ )) ∨ (¬A ∧ δν(~v ↾ mν)).
– Pσ(~v0, . . . , ~vn−1) := (A ∧ Pτ (~v0 ↾ mτ , . . . , ~vn−1 ↾ mτ )) ∨
(¬A ∧ Pν(~v0 ↾ mν , . . . , ~vn−1 ↾ mν))
Note that in the definition of τ〈A〉ν we used a padding mechanism. In case, for
example, mτ < mν , the variables vmτ , . . . , vmν−1 are used ‘vacuously’ when we
have A. If we had piecewise interpretations, where domains are built up from
pieces with possibly different dimensions, we could avoid padding by building the
domain directly of disjoint pieces with different dimensions.
A translation relates signatures; an interpretation relates theories. An interpreta-
tion K : U → V is a triple 〈U, τ, V 〉, where U and V are theories and τ : ΣU → ΣV .
We demand: for all theorems A of U , we have V ⊢ Aτ . Here are some further
definitions.
• IDU : U → U is the interpretation 〈U, idΣU , U〉.
• Suppose K : U → V and M : V → W . Then, KM := M ◦K : U → W is
〈U, τM ◦ τK ,W 〉.
• Suppose K : U → (V +A) andM : U → (V +¬A). Then K〈A〉M : U → V
is the interpretation 〈U, τK〈A〉τM , V 〉. In an appropriate category K〈A〉M
is a special case of a product.
A translation τ maps a model M to an internal model τ˜ (M) provided that M |=
∃~x δτ (~x ). Thus, an interpretationK : U → V gives us a mapping K˜ fromMOD(V ),
the class of models of V , to MOD(U), the class of models of U . If we build a
category of theories and interpretations, usually MOD with MOD(K) := K˜ will be
a contravariant functor.
We use U
K
−→ V or K : U ✁ V or K : V ✄ U as alternative notations for
K : U → V . The alternative notations ✁ and ✄ are used in a context where we are
interested in interpretability as a preorder or as a provability analogue.
We write: U ✁ V and U ✄ V , for: there is an interpretation K : U ✁ V . We use
U ≡ V , for: U ✁ V and U ✄ V .
The arrow notations are mostly used in a context where we are interested in a
category of interpretations, but also simply when they improve readability.
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We write U ✁loc V or V ✄loc U for: for all finite subtheories U0 of U , U0 ✁ V . We
pronounce this as: U is locally interpretable in V or V locally interprets U . We
use ≡loc for the induced equivalence relation of ✁loc.
2.3. Complexity and Restricted Provability. Restricted provability plays an
important role in the study of interpretability between sequential theories. An
n-proof is a proof from axioms with Go¨del number smaller or equal than n only
involving formulas of complexity smaller or equal than n. To work conveniently
with this notion, a good complexity measure is needed. Such a measure should
satisfy three conditions.
i. Eliminating terms in favor of a relational formulation should raise the com-
plexity only by a fixed standard number.
ii. Translation of a formula via the translation τ should raise the complexity of
the formula by a fixed standard number depending only on τ .
iii. The tower of exponents involved in cut-elimination should be of height linear
in the complexity of the formulas involved in the proof.
Such a good measure of complexity together with a verification of desideratum (iii)
—a form of nesting degree of quantifier alternations— is supplied in the work of
Philipp Gerhardy. See [Ger03] and [Ger05]. A slightly different measure is provided
by Samuel Buss in [Bus15]. Buss also proves that (iii) is fulfilled for his measure.
In fact, Buss proves a sharper result. He shows that the bound is d + O(1) for d
alternations. In the present paper, we will follow Buss’ treatment.
We work over a signature Θ. The formula-classes we define are officially called
Σ∗n(Θ) and Π
∗
n(Θ). However, we will suppress the Θ when it is clear from the
context. Let AT be the class of atomic formulas for Θ, extended with ⊤ and ⊥. We
define:
• Σ∗0 := Π
∗
0 := ∅.
• Σ∗n+1 ::=
AT | ¬Π∗n+1 | (Σ
∗
n+1∧Σ
∗
n+1) | (Σ
∗
n+1∨Σ
∗
n+1) | (Π
∗
n+1 → Σ
∗
n+1) | ∃vΣ
∗
n+1 | ∀vΠ
∗
n.
• Π∗n+1 ::=
AT | ¬Σ∗n+1 | (Π
∗
n+1∧Π
∗
n+1) | (Π
∗
n+1∨Π
∗
n+1) | (Σ
∗
n+1 → Π
∗
n+1) | ∀vΠ
∗
n+1 | ∃vΣ
∗
n.
Buss uses Σn+1 and Πn+1 where we use Σ
∗
n+1 and Π
∗
n+1. We employ the asterix
to avoid confusion with the usual complexity classes in the arithmetical hierarchy
where bounded quantifiers also play a role. Secondly, we modified Buss’ inductive
definition a bit in order to get unique generation histories. For example, Buss adds
Π∗n to Σ
∗
n+1 in stead of ∀vΠ
∗
n. In addition our Σ
∗
0 and Π
∗
0 are empty, where Buss’
corresponding classes consist of the quantifier-free formulas.
Here is the parse-tree of ∀x (∀y ∃z Pxyz → ∃u ∃v Qxuv) as an element of Σ∗4.
Σ∗4 : ∀x
Π∗3 :→
❛
❛
❛
✦
✦
✦
Σ∗3 : ∀y
Π∗2 : ∃z
Σ∗1 : Pxyz
Π∗3 : ∃u
Σ∗2 : ∃v
Σ∗2 : Qxuv
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The extensional equivalence, for n > 0 of our definition to Buss’s is immediate from
the following:
Fact 2.1. The quantifier-free formulas are in Σ∗1 ∩ Π
∗
1 and
Σ∗n ∪ Π
∗
n ⊆ Σ
∗
n+1 ∩ Π
∗
n+1.
The proof is by five simple inductions. We define:
• ∆∗n+1 ::=
AT | ¬∆∗n+1 | (∆
∗
n+1 ∧∆
∗
n+1) | (∆
∗
n+1 ∨∆
∗
n+1) | (∆
∗
n+1 → ∆
∗
n+1) | ∃vΣ
∗
n | ∀vΠ
∗
n.
We have:
Theorem 2.2. ∆∗n+1 = Σ
∗
n+1 ∩ Π
∗
n+1.
Proof. That ∆∗n+1 ⊆ Σ
∗
n+1 ∩ Π
∗
n+1 is an easy induction based on Fact 2.1. We
prove the converse by ordinary induction on formulas. The atomic case and the
propositional cases are immediate. Suppose A in Σ∗n+1 ∩ Π
∗
n+1 has the form ∃v B.
Then B must be in Σ∗n. It follows that A is in Σ
∗
n and, thus, that A is in ∆
∗
n+1. ✷
We want a complexity measure ρ(A) such that ρ(A) is the smallest n such that A is
in Σ∗n. This measure is very close to the measure that was employed in [Vis93]. We
recursively define this measure by taking ρ := ρ∃, where ρ∃ is defined as follows:
• ρ∃(A) := ρ∀(A) = 1, if A is atomic.
• ρ∃(¬B) := ρ∀(B), ρ∀(¬B) := ρ∃(B).
• ρ∃(B ∧ C) := max(ρ∃(B), ρ∃(C)), ρ∀(B ∧ C) := max(ρ∀(B), ρ∀(C)).
• ρ∃(B ∨ C) := max(ρ∃(B), ρ∃(C)), ρ∀(B ∨ C) := max(ρ∀(B), ρ∀(C)).
• ρ∃(B → C) := max(ρ∀(B), ρ∃(C)), ρ∀(B → C) := max(ρ∃(B), ρ∀(C)).
• ρ∃(∃v B) := ρ∃(B), ρ∀(∃v B) := ρ∃(B) + 1.
• ρ∃(∀v B) := ρ∀(B) + 1, ρ∀(∀v B) := ρ∀(B).
• ρ(A) := ρ∃(A), ρ0(A) := max(ρ∃(A), ρ∀(A)).
We verify the basic facts about ρ.
Theorem 2.3. ρ∀(A) ≤ ρ∃(A) + 1 and ρ∃(A) ≤ ρ∀(A) + 1.
Proof. The proof is by induction on A. We treat the case that A = ∃v B. We have:
ρ∀(∃v B) = ρ∃(B) + 1 = ρ∃(∃v B) + 1. Note that this does not use the induction
hypothesis. ✷
Theorem 2.4. Σ∗n = {A | ρ∃(A) ≤ n} and Π
∗
n = {A | ρ∀(A) ≤ n}. It follows that,
for n > 0, we have ∆∗n = {A | ρ0(A) ≤ n}
Proof. We prove, by induction on n, that: A ∈ Σ∗n iff ρ∃(A) ≤ n and A ∈ Π
∗
n iff
ρ∀(A) ≤ n.
The case of 0 is clear. We prove by induction on the definition of Σ∗n+1, that
A ∈ Σ∗n+1 iff ρ∃(A) ≤ n + 1. The atomic case, the propositional cases and the
existential case are clear. Suppose A = ∀v B. If A is in A ∈ Σ∗n+1, then B is in Π
∗
n.
By the Induction Hypothesis, ρ∀(B) ≤ n, so ρ∃(A) ≤ n+1. If ρ∃(A) ≤ n+1, then
ρ∀(B) ≤ n. Hence, by the Induction Hypothesis, B ∈ Π∗n, so A ∈ Σ
∗
n+1. The case
of Π∗n+1 is similar. ✷
Let τ : Σ→ Θ be a translation. We define ρ∗(τ) to be the maximum of ρ0(δτ ) and
the the ρ0(Pτ ), for P in Σ. If K is an interpretation, then ρ
∗(K) := ρ∗(τK).
Theorem 2.5. Let τ : Σ→ Θ. We have:
ρ∃(A
τ ) ≤ ρ∃(A) + ρ
∗(τ) and ρ∀(A
τ ) ≤ ρ∀(A) + ρ
∗(τ).
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Proof. The proof is by induction on A. The case of the atoms is trivial.
We treat the case of implication and ρ∃. Suppose A is B → C. We have:
ρ∃(A
τ ) = max(ρ∀(B
τ ), ρ∃(C
τ ))
≤ max(ρ∀(B) + ρ
⋆(τ), ρ(C) + ρ∗(τ))
= max(ρ∀(B), ρ∃(C)) + ρ
∗(τ)
= ρ∃(A) + ρ
∗(τ)
The other cases concerning the propositional connectives are similar.
We treat the case for universal quantification and ρ∃. Suppose A is ∀v B. We have:
ρ∃(A
τ ) = ρ∃(∀~v (δτ (~v)→ B
τ ))
= ρ∀(δτ (~v)→ B
τ ) + 1
= max(ρ∃(δτ (~v)), ρ∀(B
τ )) + 1
≤ ρ∀(B) + ρ
∗(τ) + 1
= ρ∃(A) + ρ
∗(τ)
The remaining cases for the quantifiers are similar or easier. ✷
2.4. Sequential Theories. The notion of sequentiality is due to Pavel Pudla´k.
See, e.g., [Pud83], [Pud85], [MPS90], [HP93].
To define sequentiality we use the auxiliary theory AS+ (Adjunctive Set Theory
with extras). The signature A of AS+ consists of unary predicate symbols N and
Z, binary predicate symbols ∈, E, ≤, <, S, ternary predicate symbols A and M.
AS+1 We have a set of axioms that provide a relative interpretation N of S12
in AS+, where N represents the natural numbers, E represents numerical
identity, Z stands for zero modulo E, A stands for addition modulo E, and M
stands for multiplication modulo E.
AS+2 ⊢ ∃x∀y y 6∈ x,
AS+3 ⊢ ∀x∃y ∀z (z ∈ y ↔ z = x),
AS+4 ⊢ ∀x, y ∃z ∀u (u ∈ z ↔ (u ∈ x ∨ u ∈ y)),
AS+5 ⊢ ∀x, y ∃z ∀u (u ∈ z ↔ (u ∈ x ∧ u ∈ y)),
AS+6 ⊢ ∀x, y ∃z ∀u (u ∈ z ↔ (u ∈ x ∧ ¬u ∈ y)).
An important point is that we do not demand extensionality for our sets. A many-
sorted version of AS+ would be somewhat more natural. We refrain from developing
it in this way here to avoid the additional burden of working with interpretations
between many-sorted theories.
A theory is sequential iff it interprets the theory AS+ via a direct interpretation
S. We call such an S a sequence scheme.
It is possible to work with an even simpler base theory. The theory AS is given
by the following axioms.
AS1 ⊢ ∃y ∀x x 6∈ y,
AS2 ⊢ ∀x ∀y ∃z ∀u (u ∈ z ↔ (u ∈ y ∨ u = x)).
One can show that AS is mutually directly interpretable with AS+. For details
concerning the bootstrap see e.g. the textbook [HP93] and also [MPS90], [Vis09],
[Vis11b], [Vis13].
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Remark 2.6. We could work in a somewhat richer class of theories, the polyse-
quential theories. See [Vis13].
Let’s say that an interpretation is m-direct, if it is m-dimensional, if its domain
consists of all m-tuples of the original domain, and if identity is interpreted as
component-wise identity. A theory U is m-sequential, if there is an m-direct in-
terpretation of AS in U . A theory is polysequential, if it is m-sequential for some
m ≥ 1. Note that if we want the AS+ format, the interpretation of the natural num-
bers should also be chosen to be m-dimensional for the given m. The development
given in the present paper also works with minor adaptations in the polysequential
case.
It is known that there are polysequential theories that are not sequential. How-
ever, I only have an artificial example. Every polysequential theory is polysequential
without parameters, where a sequential theory may essentially need an interpreta-
tion with parameters to witness its sequentiality. (One raises the dimension to ‘eat
up’ the parameters.) Polysequential theories are closed under bi-interpretability.
Moreover, every polysequential theory is bi-interpretable with a sequential one.
2.5. Satisfaction & Reflection. In this subsection, we develop partial satisfac-
tion predicates for sequential theories with some care. We prove the corresponding
partial reflection principles. This subsection is rather long because it provides many
details. The impatient reader could choose to proceed to Theorem 2.17, since that
is the main result of the subsection that we will use in the rest of the paper.
Consider any signature Θ. We extend the signature A of AS+ in a disjoint way with
Θ to, say, A+Θ. Call the resulting theory (without any new axioms) AS+(Θ).
We work towards the definition of partial satisfaction predicates, We provide a
series of definitions illustrative of what we need to get off the ground.
• pair(u, v, w) :↔ ∃a ∃b (∀c (c ∈ w ↔ (c = a ∨ c = b)) ∧
∀d (d ∈ a↔ d = u) ∧ ∀e (e ∈ b↔ (e = u ∨ e = v))).
We can easily show that for all u and v there is a w such that pair(u, v, w)
and, whenever pair(u, v, w) and pair(u′, v′, w), then u = u′ and v = v′. Note
that there may be several w such that pair(u, v, w).
• Pair(w) :↔ ∃u ∃v pair(u, v, w).
• π0(w, u) :↔ ∃v pair(u, v, w).
• π1(w, v) :↔ ∃u pair(u, v, w).
• fun(f) :↔ ∀w ∈ f (pair(w) ∧ ∀w′ ∈ f ∀u (π0(w, u) ∧ π0(w′, u)→ w = w′)).
Note that we adapt the notion of function to our non-extensional pairing.
We demand that there is at most one witnessing pair for a given argument.
This choice makes resetting a function on an argument where it is defined
a simple operation: we subtract one pair and we add one.
• dom(f, x) :↔ fun(f) ∧ ∃w ∈ f π0(w, x).
• f(u) ≈ v :↔ fun(f) ∧ ∃w ∈ f pair(u, v, w).
• nfun(α) :↔ ∀w ∈ α (pair(w) ∧ ∀u (π0(w, u)→ N(u)) ∧
∀w′ ∈ α ∀u ∀u′ ((π0(w, u) ∧ π0(w′, u′) ∧ u E u′)→ w = w′)).
We note that nfun(f) implies fun(f).
• ndom(α, a) :↔ nfun(α) ∧ ∃w ∈ f ∃b (a E b ∧ π0(w, b)).
• We fix a parameter x⋆.
α[a] ≈ v :↔ nfun(α) ∧ (∃w ∈ α ∃b (a E b ∧ pair(b, v, w)) ∨
(¬ ndom(α, a) ∧ v = x⋆)).
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So outside of ndom we set the value of α to a default value. In this way we
made it a total function on the natural numbers.2
• α [[a]]β :↔ ∀b (ndom(β, b)↔ (ndom(α, b) ∨ b E a)) ∧
∀b ∀x ((N(b) ∧ ¬ a E b)→ (α[b] ≈ x↔ β[b] ≈ x)).
• α[a : y] ≈ β :↔ α [[a]]β ∧ β[a] ≈ y.
We will use α, β to range over functions with numerical domains (elements of nfun).
We note that AS+(Θ) proves that the ‘operation’ α 7→ α[a : y] is total and that any
output sequences are extensionally the same.
We employ a usual efficient coding of syntax in the interpretation N of S12. We
have shown above how to formulate things in order to cope with the fact that each
number, set, pair, function and sequence can have several representatives. The
definition of satisfaction would be completely unreadable if we tried to adhere to
this high standard. Hence, we will work more informally pretending, for example,
that each number has just one representative. An assignment will simply be a
numerical function where we restrict our attention to the codes of variables in the
domain.
A sat-sequence is a triple of the form 〈i, α,A〉, where: i is + or − (coded as, say, 1
and 0), α is an assignment and A is a formula. An a-sat-sequence is a sat-sequence
〈i, α,A〉, where A is Σ∗a, if i = + and A is Π
∗
a, if i = −. We call the virtual class of
all a-sat sequences Ka.
A set X is good if, for all numbers b the virtual class X ∩Kb exists as a set. We
have:
Lemma 2.7. (AS+(Θ)). The good sets are closed under the empty sets, singletons,
union, intersection and subtraction and are downwards closed w.r.t. the subset
ordering.
Proof. We leave the easy proof to the reader. ✷
We count two sat-sequences 〈i, α,A〉 and 〈j, β, B〉 as extensionally equal if (i) i
and j are E-equal, (ii) α and β have the same functional behaviour on the natural
numbers N, and (iii) A and B are E-equal. We say that a sequence σ is of the form
〈i, α,A〉 if it is extensionally equal to a sequence τ with τ0 = i, τ1 = α and τ2 = A.
We define n + 1-adequacy and satn by external recursion on n. We define
sat0(+, α, A) :↔ ⊥ and sat0(−, α, A) :↔ ⊤. We define satn+1(i, α,A) iff, for some
n + 1-adequate set X , we have 〈i, α,A〉 ∈ X . A set X is n + 1-adequate, if it is
good, if its elements are sat-sequences, and if it satisfies the following clauses:
a. If a sequence of the form 〈+, β, P (v0, v1)〉 is in X , then P (β(v0), β(v1)).
3
Similarly, for other atomic formulas including ⊤ and ⊥.
2The need for a parameter is regrettable but in a sequential theory there need not be definable
elements. Of course, we could set the value at a outside the ndom of α to α, but that would mean
that when we reset our function we would change all the values outside the ndom too. One way
to eliminate the parameter would be to make the default value an extra part of the data for the
function. Then, a reset would keep the default value in tact. The option of working with partial
functions is certainly feasible. However, e.g., clause (e) of the definition of adequate set would be
more complicated.
3Our variables are coded as numbers. Conceivably not all numbers code variables. The values
of β on non-variables are simply don’t care.
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b. If a sequence of the form 〈−, β, P (v0, v1)〉 is in X , then ¬P (β(v0), β(v1)).
Similarly, for other atomic formulas including ⊤ and ⊥.
c. If a sequence of the form 〈+, β,¬B〉 is inX , then a sequence of the form 〈−, β, B〉
is in X .
d. If a sequence of the form 〈−, β,¬B〉 is inX , then a sequence of the form 〈+, β, B〉
is in X .
e. If a sequence of the form 〈+, β, (B ∧ C)〉 is in X , then sequences of the form
〈+, β, B〉 and 〈+, β, C〉 are in X .
f. If a sequence of the form 〈−, β, (B ∧ C)〉 is in X , then a sequence of the form
〈−, β, B〉 is in X or a sequence of the form 〈−, β, C〉 is in X .
g. If a sequence of the form 〈+, β, (B ∨ C)〉 is in X , then a sequence of the form
〈+, β, B〉 is in X or a sequence of the form 〈+, β, C〉 is in X .
h. If a sequence of the form 〈−, β, (B ∨ C)〉 is in X , then sequences of the form
〈−, β, B〉 and 〈−, β, C〉 are in X .
i. If a sequence of the form 〈+, β, (B → C)〉 is in X , then a sequence of the form
〈−, β, B〉 is in X or a sequence of the form 〈+, β, C〉 is in X .
j. If a sequence of the form 〈−, β, (B → C)〉 is in X , then sequences of the form
〈+, β, B〉 and 〈−, β, C〉 are in X .
k. If a sequence of the form 〈+, β, ∃v B〉 is in X , then, for some γ with β [[v]] γ, a
sequence of the form 〈+, γ, B〉 is in X .
l. If a sequence of the form 〈−, β, ∃v B〉 is in X , then ¬ satn(+, β, ∃v B).
m. If a sequence of the form 〈+, β, ∀v B〉 is in X , then ¬ satn(−, β, ∀v B).
n. If a sequence of the form 〈−, β, ∀v B〉 is in X , then, for some γ with β [[v]] γ, a
sequence of the form 〈−, γ, B〉 is in X .
Note that if σ and τ are extensionally equal and if X is n-adequate and σ is in X ,
then the result of replacing σ in X by τ is again n-adequate.
We will often write α |=in A for: satn(i, α,A). The relation satn, when restricted to
Kn, will have a number of desirable properties. We write sat∗n for satn ∩ Kn.
We note that we have implicitly given a formula Φ0(X , i, α, A), where X is a second
order variable with:
satn+1(i, α,A) = Φ0(satn, i, α, A).
Thus, for some fixed standard c0, we have ρ(satn+1(u, v, w)) = ρ(satn(u, v, w))+ c0.
It follows that ρ(satn(u, v, w)) = c0n+ c1, for some fixed standard number c1.
Remark 2.8. We note that X occurs twice in the formula Φ0(X , k, α,A) described
above. This has no effect on the growth of the complexity of the formula satn but
it makes the number of symbols of the formula satn grow exponentially in n. For
the purposes of this paper, this is good enough. However, a slightly more careful
rewrite of our definition reduces the number of occurrences of X to one. As a
consequence, we can get the number of symbols of satn linear in n. So, the code
of satn will be bounded by a polynomial in n, assuming we use an efficient Go¨del
numbering.
Our next step is to verify in AS+(Σ) some good properties of n+ 1-adequacy and
satn. We first show that n-adequacy is preserved under certain operations.
Theorem 2.9. The n-adequate sets are closed under unions and under intersection
with the virtual class of a-sat-sequences, for any a.
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Proof. Closure under unions is immediate given that good sets are closed under
unions. Closure under restriction to a-sat-sequences is immediate by the definition
of good and the fact that our formula classes are closed under subformulas. ✷
We prove a theorem connecting sat∗k and sat
∗
n, for k < n. We remind the reader
that Kk is the virtual class of all k-sat-sequences and sat∗n = satn ∩ Kn.
Theorem 2.10 (AS+(Θ)). Suppose k < n. Then, sat∗k = sat
∗
n ∩Kk.
Proof. The proof is by external induction on n. The case that n = 0 is trivial.
Suppose X is n + 1-adequate set. Let Y := X ∩ Kk. We note that Y is a set
by Theorem 2.9. We claim that Y is k-adequate. It is clear that Y satisfies all
clauses for a k-adequate set automatically except (l) and (m). Let’s zoom in on
(l). Suppose a sequence of the form 〈−, β, ∃v B〉 is in Y . From this it follows
that k 6= 0. Since X is n + 1-adequate, it follows that: ¬ satn(+, β, ∃v B). By
the induction hypothesis, we find that ¬ satk−1(+, β, ∃v B). Hence, the clause for
k-adequacy is fulfilled. Clause (m) is similar.
Conversely, suppose Z is k-adequate. Let W := Z ∩ Kk. The argument that W is
also n+ 1-adequate, is analogous to the argument above. ✷
We note that in the proof of Theorem 2.10, we could as well do the induction on
k. This observation is important in case we study models with a full satisfaction
predicate. In this context, we can replace n by a non-standard number and still get
our result for standard k.
In the following theorem we prove the commutation conditions for satn+1.
Theorem 2.11 (AS+(Θ)). We have:
a. β |=+n+1 P (v0, v1) iff P (β(v0), β(v1)),
and similarly for the other atomic formulas including ⊤ and ⊥,
b. β |=−n+1 P (v0, v1) iff ¬P (β(v0), β(v1)),
and similarly for the other atomic formulas including ⊤ and ⊥,
c. β |=+n+1 ¬B iff β |=
−
n+1 B,
d. β |=−n+1 ¬B iff β |=
+
n+1 B,
e. β |=+n+1 B ∧ C iff β |=
+
n+1 B and β |=
+
n+1 C,
f. β |=−n+1 B ∧ C iff β |=
−
n+1 B or β |=
−
n+1 C,
g. β |=+n+1 B ∨ C iff β |=
+
n+1 B or β |=
+
n+1 C,
h. β |=−n+1 B ∨ C iff β |=
−
n+1 B and β |=
−
n+1 C,
i. β |=+n+1 B → C iff β |=
−
n+1 B or β |=
+
n+1 C,
j. β |=−n+1 B → C iff β |=
+
n+1 B and β |=
−
n+1 C,
k. β |=+n+1 ∃v B iff, for some γ with β [[v]] γ, we have γ |=
+
n+1 B,
l. β |=−n+1 ∃v B iff β 6|=
+
n ∃v B,
m. β |=+n+1 ∀v B iff β 6|=
−
n ∀v B,
n. β |=−n+1 ∀v B iff, for some γ with β [[v]] γ, we have γ |=
−
n+1 B.
Proof. We will treat the illustrative clauses (e), (k) and (l). In the first two cases
the right-to-left direction is trivial.
Ad (e). Suppose X witnesses that β |=+n+1 B and Y witnesses that β |=
+
n+1 C.
Let σ be a triple of the form 〈β,+, (B ∧ C)〉. Let Z be a union of X and Y and a
singleton with element σ. It is immediate that Z witnesses β |=+n+1 B ∧C.
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Ad (k). Suppose that β [[v]] γ and that X witnesses that γ |=+n+1 B. Let σ be of the
form 〈β,+, ∃v B〉. Let Y be a union of X and a singleton with element σ. Then Y
witnesses β |=+n+1 ∃v B.
Ad (l). Suppose β 6|=+n B. Let σ be a triple of the form 〈β,−, ∃v B〉. Let X be
a singleton with element σ. Then X witnesses β |=−n+1 ∃v B. Conversely, if Y
witnesses β |=−n+1 ∃v B, then we must have ¬ satn(β,+, ∃v B). ✷
We note that the commutation conditions are inherited by sat∗n+1, provided that
the formulas in the conditions belong to the right classes.
The commutation conditions proven in Theorem 2.11 are not yet full commutation
conditions. The defect is in the clauses (l) and (m). Let’s zoom in on (m):
• β |=+n+1 ∀v B iff β 6|=
−
n ∀v B.
The right-hand-side is equivalent to: for all γ with β [[v]] γ, we have γ 6|=−n+1 B. To
get the desired commutation condition, we would like to move from γ 6|=−n+1 B to
γ |=+n+1 B. We have seen in Theorem 2.10 that to make our predicates behave in
expected ways, it is better to consider the formulas in their ‘intended range’. So
what if ∀v B is in Σ∗n+1? In this case B must be in Π
∗
n and hence in ∆
∗
n+1. So
is it true that if C is in ∆∗n+1, then α 6|=
−
n+1 C iff α |=
+
n+1 C? To prove this we
need induction, which we do not have available in AS+(Θ). The solution is to move
to a cut. To realize this, we define a second measure of complexity ν (depth of
connectives) as follows: ν(A) := 0 if A is atomic, ν(¬A) := ν(∃v A) := ν(∀v A) :=
ν(A) + 1 and ν(A ◦ B) := max(ν(A), ν(B)) + 1, where ◦ is a binary propositional
connective. Let Γx := {A | ν(A) ≤ x}. We define:
• J†n+1 is the virtual class of all numbers x such that, for all α and for all
C ∈ ∆∗n+1 ∩ Γx, we have α 6|=
−
n+1 C iff α |=
+
n+1 C.
We have:
Theorem 2.12 (AS+(Θ)). J†n+1 contains 0, is closed under successor and is down-
wards closed w.r.t. ≤.
Proof. Downwards closure is immediate.
By definition, we have α 6|=−n+1 C iff α |=
+
n+1 C if C is an atom. So 0 is in J
†
n+1.
Suppose x is in J†n+1. We will show that x+1 is in J
†
n+1, i.e. for all C ∈ ∆
∗
n+1∩Γx+1,
we have α 6|=−n+1 C iff α |=
+
n+1 C.
The case for atomic C follows by previous reasoning. Suppose, for example, that
C := (D → E) is in ∆∗n+1 ∩ Γx+1. Then D and E are both in ∆
∗
n+1 ∩ Γx. By the
fact that x is in J†n+1 we find:
α |=+n+1 (D → E) ↔ (α |=
−
n+1 D) or (α |=
+
n+1 E)
↔ (α 6|=+n+1 D) or (α 6|=
−
n+1 E)
↔ ¬ ((α |=+n+1 D) and (α |=
−
n+1 E))
↔ ¬ α |=−n+1 (D → E).
The other unary and binary propositional connectives are similar. Now suppose
C is of the form ∃v D and C ∈ ∆∗n+1 ∩ Γx+1. Since C is in Π
∗
n+1, we must have
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D ∈ Σ∗n. It follows that n 6= 0. We have, by Theorem 2.10:
α |=+n+1 ∃v D ↔ α |=
+
n ∃v D
↔ α 6|=−n+1 ∃v D
Curiously, this step does not not use the fact that x is in J†n+1. The case of ∀ is
similar. ✷
Thus, for any C in ∆∗n+1 ∩ ΓJ†
n+1
we have α 6|=−n+1 C iff α |=
+
n+1 C. Hence, we also
have the full Tarskian commutation clauses for these C.
We note that J†n+1 is Φ1(n + 1, satn+1, x), for a standard formula Φ1(y,X , x).
Thus the ρ-complexity of J†n+1 is linear in n where the relevant linear term is of
the form c0n+ c2.
We still miss an important ingredient. Let 〈i, α,A〉 be a sat-sequence. Suppose α
and β assign the same values to the free variables in A. Do we have α |=in A iff
β |=in A? To prove such a thing we need induction. We would like to have even
more than this, since we want to check the validity of the inference rules for the
quantifiers. We define the property Qn+1 by:
• The formula A has the property Qn+1 if the following holds. Consider
any sat-sequence 〈i, α,A〉. Suppose w is free for v in A. Let B be (of the
form) A[v := w]. Suppose further that the functions α[u] = β[u] for all free
variables u of A, except possibly v, and that β[w] = α[v]. Then, α |=in+1 A
iff β |=in+1 B.
We allow that v and w are equal and that v does not occur in A. Both degenerate
cases tell us that Qn+1(A) implies that α |=in+1 A iff β |=
i
n+1 A, whenever α and β
agree on the free variables of A.
We can now proceed in two ways to construct a cut that gives us the desired
property for the formulas of ν-complexity in the cut. One way does not involve
the Σ∗n and the Π
∗
n and one way does involve them. The second way yields a more
efficient construction of the cut. For completeness, we explore both ways.
We first address the first way. We define:
• J◦0 := N, x ∈ J
◦
n+1 := {x ∈ J
◦
n | Γx ⊆ Qn+1}.
We note that the definition of J◦n+1 is of the form Φ2(satn+1, J
◦
n, x) for a fixed
Φ2(X ,Y, x). So, ρ(J◦n+1) = max(ρ(satn+1), ρ(J
◦
n)) + c3, for a fixed standard c3. It
follows that ρ(J◦n) is estimated some linear term c4n+ c5.
Theorem 2.13 (AS+(Θ)). The virtual class J◦n is closed under 0, successor, and
is downwardly closed w.r.t. ≤.
Proof. Closure under 0 and downwards closure are trivial. We prove closure under
successor by induction on n. The case of J◦0 is trivial. Suppose that J
◦
n is closed
under successor. Consider x in J◦n+1. Let C and D be in Γx.
Let A be of the form (C ∧ D). Suppose w is free for v in A. Let B be (of the
form) A[v := w]. Suppose further that α and β assign the same values to the free
variables of A except v and β[w] = α[v]. Clearly B is of the form E ∧ F , where E
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is of the form C[v := w] and F is of the form D[v := w]. We have:
α |=+n+1 C ∧D ↔ α |=
+
n+1 C and α |=
+
n+1 D
↔ β |=+n+1 E and β |=
+
n+1 F
↔ β |=+n+1 E ∧ F
Similarly for the |=−-case. The other propositional cases are similar.
We treat the case of the existential quantifier, the case of the universal quantifier
being similar. Let A be of the form ∃z C. Suppose w is free for v in A. Let B be
(of the form) A[v := w]. Suppose further that α and β assign the same values to
the free variables of A except v and β[w] = α[v].
We first address the |=+-case. The argument splits into two subcases. First we
have the case that z is (of the form) v, we find that B is of the form A. Hence,
replacing z by v, we have:
α |=+n+1 ∃v C ↔ ∃γ (α [[v]] γ and γ |=
+
n+1 C)
↔ ∃δ (β [[v]] δ and δ |=+n+1 C)
↔ β |=+n+1 ∃v C
For example, in the left-to-right direction of the second step we can take δ of the
form β[v : γ(v)]. We can use the fact that C has ν-complexity x and x ∈ J◦n+1.
The property Qn+1 is applied with v in the role of both v and w.
Next we have the case that z and w are different variables. Let D be of the form
C[v : w]. So B is of the form ∃z D. We have:
α |=+n+1 ∃z C ↔ ∃γ (α [[z]] γ and γ |=
+
n+1 C)
↔ ∃δ (β [[z]] δ and δ |=+n+1 D)
↔ β |=+n+1 ∃z D
E.g., in the left-to-right direction of the second step we can again take δ of the form
β[z : γ(z)].
Finally we address the |=−-case. We have:
α |=−n+1 ∃v C ↔ ¬ α |=
+
n ∃v C
↔ ¬ β |=+n ∃v D
↔ β |=−n+1 ∃v D
Here we use the fact that x ∈ J◦n, so that also x+ 1 ∈ J
◦
n. ✷
We turn to the second approach. We define:
• J⋆n+1 := {x ∈ N | (Γx ∩∆
∗
n+1) ⊆ Qn+1}.
We have:
Theorem 2.14 (AS+(Θ)). The virtual class J⋆n+1 is closed under 0, successor and
is downwards closed w.r.t. ≤.
Proof. The cases of closure under 0 and downwards closure are trivial. Suppose x
is in J⋆n+1. The cases of the propositional connectives use the same argument as we
saw in the proof of theorem 2.13. We turn to the case of the existential quantifier,
the case of the universal quantifier being dual. Suppose C is in Γx ∩ ∆∗n+1. The
case of |=+ is again the same as we saw in the proof of Theorem 2.13. We consider
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the case of |=−. Suppose ∃v C is in ∆∗n+1. In this case ∃v C must be in Σ
∗
n. We
have:
α |=−n+1 ∃v C ↔ ¬α |=
+
n ∃v C
↔ ¬α |=+n+1 ∃v C
↔ ¬β |=+n+1 ∃v D
↔ ¬β |=+n ∃v D
↔ β |=−n+1 ∃v D
The first and the fifth step use the commutation conditions for ∃. The second
and the fourth step use Theorem 2.10. The third step uses the previous case for
|=+. ✷
We note that the definition of J⋆n+1 is of the form Φ3(n, Sat). So, its ρ0-complexity
is estimated by a linear term of the form c0n + c6. Here the use of J
⋆
n+1 has an
advantage over J◦n, since construction of the J
◦
m gives us a linear complexity but
conceivably with a higher constant as coefficient of n.
Let us take stock of what we accomplished. We have defined virtual classes J⋆n+1
that are closed under 0 and S and that are downwards closed such that for all
formulas A in ΓJ⋆
n+1
∩∆∗n+1, we have, for all α, that α |=
+
n+1 A iff α 6|=
−
n+1 A. Here
ΓJ⋆
n+1
:=
⋃
x∈J⋆
n+1
Γx.
Also, we have developed virtual classes J◦n+1 and J
⋆
n+1 such that all A in ΓJ◦n+1,
and, similarly, all A in ΓJ⋆
n+1
∩∆n+1 have the property Qn+1 defined above.
So, if we take J‡n+1 either J
⋆
n+1 ∩ J
◦
n+1 or J
⋆
n+1 ∩ J
⋆
n+1 then J
‡
n+1 is progressive
and all elements of Ξn+1 := ΓJ‡
n+1
∩∆n+1 have both good properties. Let us choose
for J⋆ in the definition of Ξn+1, so that its ρ-complexity is estimated by c0n+ c7.
We summarize the result in a theorem.
Theorem 2.15. We have full commutation of sat(+, ·, ·) for the Ξn+1-formulas.
Moreover, the Ξn+1-formulas have propertu Qn+1.
We write A 3n A for the formalization of A ⊢n A, where A codes a finite set
of formulas and ⊢n is provability in predicate logic where we restrict ourselves in
the proof to Ξn+1-formulas. We choose to code the set of formulas in the natural
numbers. This is a bit unnatural since AS(Θ) contains sets as first-class citizens.
However, if we code sets of formulas in the sets provided by AS(Θ) directly we do
not know, for example, that ass(p) the set of assumptions of a proof p is a set.
Of course, this problem can be evaded by shortening N in such a way that any
set coded in the natural numbers maps to first-class set. If the reader prefers this
other road, we think it is sufficiently clear how to adapt the results below to this
alternative approach.
We write p : A 3n A for: p is the code of a n-proof witnessing A 3n A. We
write Λn,y for the class of n-proofs p where the number of steps of p is ≤ y. On the
semantical side, we define, for A ∪ {A} ⊆ Ξn+1:
A |=n+1 A :↔ ∀α (∀A
′ ∈ A satn+1(+, α, A
′)→ satn+1(+, α, A)).
We work in AS+(Θ). We write ass(p) for the assumption set of (proof code) p. Let
Yn be the class of y such that, for all p ∈ Λn,y, if p : ass(p)3nA, then ass(p) |=n A.
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Theorem 2.16. The virtual class Yn is downwards closed under ≤, contains 0,
and is closed under successor.
Proof. Downwards closure under ≤ is trivial. We show that Yn is progressive.
We follow the system for Natural Deduction in sequent style as given in [TS00,
Subsection 2.1.4]. By Theorem 2.15, the propositional cases are immediate. We
will treat the introduction and the elimination rule of the universal quantifier. This
follows mainly the usual text book proof. For the convenience of the reader, we
repeat the property Qn+1:
• The formula C has the property Qn+1 if the following holds. Consider any
sat-sequence 〈i, α, C〉. Suppose u is free for z in C. Suppose further that
α[a] = β[a] for all free variables a of A except z and that β[u] = α[z]. Then,
α |=in+1 C iff β |=
i
n+1 C[z := u].
We treat the case of universal generalization. Let w be substitutable for v in A and
suppose w does not occur freely in the elements of A ∪ {A}. Suppose we have (†)
A |=n+1 A[v := w]. We show that A |=n+1 ∀v A.
Consider any α and suppose α |=+n+1 A
′, for all A′ in A . We want to show
that α |=+n+1 ∀v A. Let d be any element. It is clearly sufficient to show that
α[v : d] |=+n+1 A.
We first note that α[w : d] and α are the same on the free variables of A′ in A .
So, by Qn+1 in a degenerate case, we find that α[w : d] |=
+
n+1 A
′, for all A′ in A .
By (†), we find α[w : d] |=+n+1 A[v := w]. We note that α[w : d] and α[v : d] assign
the same values to all free variables u of A, except possibly v. This uses that w
does not occur in A. Moreover, α[w : d][w] = α[v : d][v]. So, by Qn+1(A), we find
α[v : d] |=+n+1 A iff α[w : d] |= A[v := w]. Thus, we may conclude α[v : d] |=
+
n+1 A
as desired.
We treat the case of universal instantiation. Suppose (‡) A |= ∀v A. We want to
conclude A |= A[v := w]. Suppose, for all A′ ∈ A , we have α |=+n+1 A
′. It follows
that ($) α |=+n+1 ∀v A. We want to conclude that α |= A[v := w]. From ($), we
have α[v := α[w]] |=+ A. We note that α and α[v := α[w]] assign the same values
to all free variables of A except possibly v. Moreover α[v := α[w]][v] = α[w]. By
Qn+1(A), we may conclude that α |=
+
n+1 A[v := w]. ✷
Inspecting the construction of Yn we see that it is of the form Φ4(n, satn, J
‡
n+1),
where Φ4(x,X ,Y) is a fixed formula. Thus ρ(Yn) is estimated by c0n+ c8.
We now have a refined result involving separate restrictions on ρ on ν and on the
length of the proofs. For other applications this refinement may be useful, however,
in the present paper, we will simply demand that our proofs are in a cut ℑn(Θ)
that is obtained by taking the intersection of J‡n+1 and Yn and shortening to obtain
downwards closure and closure under 0, S, +, × and ω1. Since the shortening
procedure only adds a standardly finite depth to the input formula J‡n+1 ∩ Yn,
ρ(ℑn(Θ)) will have complexity c0n+ c9. Moreover, when p is in ℑn(Θ), then ipso
facto its length is in Yn and its ν-complexity is in J
‡
n+1.
We write [A ⊢n A] for provability in predicate logic involving only ∆∗n-formulas
where the proof is constrained to be in the cut J . We write [A ⊢Jn A] when the
witness for [A ⊢n A] is constrained to the cut J . We write ✷Θ,nA for [∅ ⊢n A], and
✷
J
Θ,nA for [∅ ⊢
J
n A]. For sentences A, we will write trueΘ,n(A) for ∀α satn(+, α, A).
SMALL IS VERY SMALL 17
Theorem 2.17. We can find an ω1-cut ℑn(Θ) such that ρ(ℑn(Θ)) is of order
c0n+ c9 and such that:
AS+(Θ) ⊢ ∀A , A ([A ⊢ℑn(Θ)n A]→ A |=n A).
As a special case, we have:
AS+(Θ) ⊢ ∀A ∈ sentℑn(Θ) (✷
ℑn(Θ)
Θ,n A→ trueΘ,n(A)).
3. Small-Is-Very-Small Principles
In this section we present the central argument of this paper. It is a simple
Rosser argument. The bulk of the work has already been done in creating the
setting for the result. I choose to give the pure argument in Theorem 3.1 rather
than proceed immediately to the somewhat more complicated Theorem 3.2. The
more complicated version is needed for application in model theory.
First some preliminaries and notations, in order to avoid too heavy notational
machinery.
We will work in sequential theories U of signature Θ with sequence scheme S.
So, S : AS+
dir
−→ U . We can lift S to a direct interpretation SΘ : AS
+(Θ)
dir
−→ U by
translating Θ identically.4
We remind the reader that N : S12 → AS
+. We will write N := S ◦N : S12 → U .
So, e.g., δN = N
S . We write ℑn for (ℑn(Θ))SΘ . When we write numerals n these are
always numerals w.r.t. N . We note that the numerals really are eliminated using
the term elimination algorithm. However, this elimination just gives an overhead
on 1 in ρ0-complexity.
Let η be a Σb1-formula defining a set of axioms. We write ✷η for provability from
the axioms in η. We write ✷Jη for the result of restricting the witnesses for ✷η to J .
We write ✷η,n for the result of restricting the formulas in a witnessing proof to ∆
∗
n.
5
Formulas like ✷Jη,n have the obvious meanings. We suppress the information about
the signature Θ, which should be clear from the context. In case η = (x = pAq),
we write ✷A for ✷η.
6
We will employ witness comparison notation:
• ∃x ∈ δnA0(x) ≤ ∃y ∈ δN B0(y) iff ∃x ∈ δN (A0(x) ∧ ∀y <N x¬B0(y)).
• ∃x ∈ δnA0(x) < ∃y ∈ δN B0(y) iff ∃x ∈ δN (A0(x) ∧ ∀y ≤N x¬B0(y)).
• (∃xA0(x) ≤ ∃y B0(y))⊥ := ∃y B0(y) < ∃xA0(x).
• (∃xA0(x) < ∃y B0(y))⊥ := ∃y B0(y) ≤ ∃xA0(x).
Theorem 3.1. Let A be a finitely axiomatized sequential theory in a language with
signature Θ with sequence scheme S. Consider any sentence B in the language of
A of the form B := ∃x ∈ δN B0(x). Let n := max(ρ0(A), ρ0(B) + c10, ρ0(S) + c10).
Here c10 is a fixed finite constant that does not depend on A, B and S. We will
determine c10 below.
Suppose A ⊢ ∃x ∈ ℑnB0(x). Then, for some k, we have A ⊢ ∃x ≤N k B0(x),
or, equivalently, A ⊢
∨
q≤k B0(q).
4In case S would be a sequence scheme for a polysequential we would need a slight adaptation.
5In previous papers, I also used this notation to signal that the codes of the axioms were
constrained to be ≤ n. In this paper this extra demand is not made.
6Clearly, this introduces an ambiguity. E.g., does ✷⊤ mean provability form all sentences or
from the axiom ⊤? However, what we intend will be always clear from the context,
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Proof. We work under the conditions of the theorem. Using the Go¨del Fixed Point
Lemma, we find a sentence R such that A ⊢ R ↔ B ≤ ✷NA,nR. We need that
ρ0(R) ≤ n.
Under the usual Go¨del construction, R is of the following form:
∃x (δN(x) ∧B0(x) ∧ ∃z (δN(z) ∧ sub
N (ℓ, ℓ, z) ∧ ∀y (y <N x→ ¬ provNA,n(y, z)))).
Thus, ρ0(R) is estimated by
max(ρ0(sub), ρ0(prov)) +max(ρ0(S), ρ0(B0)) + 3.
Here the +3 is due to the additional quantifiers. We note that, if we unravel the numerals
n wide scope, we even just need +2. So, we can take c10 := max(ρ0(sub), ρ0(prov)) + 3.
Reason in A. We have ∃x ∈ ℑnB0(x). In case ¬✷
ℑn
A,nR, we have R. Suppose
✷
ℑn
A,nR. By reflection, as guaranteed by Theorem 2.17, we find R. So, in both
cases, we may conclude that R. We leave A again.
Thus, we have shown (i) A ⊢ R. By cut-elimination, we find: A ⊢n R. Hence, (ii)
for some k, we find A ⊢ proofNA,n(k,R). Combining (i) and (ii), we we may conclude
that A ⊢ ∃x ≤N k B0(x), or, equivalently, A ⊢
∨
q≤k B0(q). ✷
We note that, due to the use of cut-elimination, we need the totality of superexpo-
nentiation in the metatheory. Such theorems usually leave watered-down traces in
weaker metatheories. We do not explore such possibilities in the present paper.
The above argument has some analogies with Harvey Friedman’s beautiful proof
that, in a constructive setting, the disjunction property implies the existence prop-
erty. See [Fri75]. I analyzed this argument in [Vis14b], having the benefit of many
perceptive remarks by Emil Jerˇa´bek. One surprising aspect of the above proof is
that the minimization principle is not used. Joost Joosten pointed out to me in
conversation that the closely related Friedman-Goldfarb-Harrington Theorem also
can be proven without using minimization.
For our model theoretic applications we need a variant of Theorem 3.1 that adds
domain constants. We allow for the domain constants the exceptional position that
they are real constants rather than unary predicates posing as constants.
Theorem 3.2. Consider a finite set of domain constants C. Let A0 be any finitely
axiomatized sequential theory with signature Θ and sequence scheme S. Let A1 :=
A1(~c ) be any sentence in the language with signature Θ+ C. Let A := A0 ∧ A1.
Consider any sentence B(~c ) in the language of signature Θ + C of the form
B(~c ) := ∃x ∈ δN B0(x,~c ). Let n := max(ρ0(A), ρ0(B) + c10, ρ0(S) + c10).
Suppose A(~c ) ⊢ ∃x ∈ ℑnB0(x,~c ).
7 Then, for some k, we have that A(~c ) ⊢
∃x ≤N k B0(x,~c ), or, equivalently, A(~c ) ⊢
∨
q≤k B0(q,~c ).
Proof. We work under the conditions of the theorem. We find a sentence R(~c ) such
that A(~c ) ⊢ R(~c )↔ B(~c ) ≤ ✷NA(~c ),nR(~c ).
Reason in A(~c). In case ¬✷ℑn
A(~c ),nR(~c ), we have R(~c ). Suppose ✷
ℑn
A(~c ),nR(~c ).
Replacing the extra constants ~c, in A(~c ) and R(~c ) by fresh variables ~v, we get
[A(~v ) ⊢ℑnn R(~v )]. Hence, A(~v ) |=n R(~v ). Since A and R are standard and since
we have A(~c ), we find R(~c ).
7The fact that the constants in C do not occur in ℑn = ℑSn(Θ) is the whole point of the refined
result.
SMALL IS VERY SMALL 19
Thus, we have shown (i) A(~c ) ⊢ R(~c ). By cut-elimination, we find: A(~c ) ⊢n
R(~c ). Hence, (ii) for some k, we have A(~c ) ⊢ proofNA(~c ),n(k,R(~c )). Combining (i)
and (ii), we get A(~c ) ⊢ ∃x ≤N k B0(x,~c ), or, equivalently, A(~c ) ⊢
∨
q≤k B0(q,~c ).
✷
We call a theory U restricted if, for some m all its axioms are in ∆∗m.
Theorem 3.3. Suppose A0 is a finitely axiomatized sequential theory in signature
Θ with sequence scheme S. Let m be any number such that m ≥ ρ0(A0). Let C be a
set of domain constants: C is allowed to have any cardinality. Let U be a restricted
theory bounded by m in the language of signature Θ+ C extending A0. The theory
U may have any complexity.
Consider any sentence B in the language of signature Θ + C of the form B :=
∃x ∈ δN B0(x). Let n := max(m, ρ0(B) + c10, ρ0(S) + c10).
Suppose U ⊢ ∃x ∈ ℑnB0(x). Then, for some k, we have U ⊢ ∃x ≤N k B0(x),
or, equivalently, U ⊢
∨
q≤k B0(q).
Proof. The theorem is immediate from Theorem 3.2, using compactness. ✷
It is of course trivial to take the contraposition of Theorem 3.3. However this
contraposion has some heuristic value. So we state it here as a separate theorem.
Theorem 3.4. Suppose A0 is a finitely axiomatized sequential theory in signature
Θ with sequence scheme S. Let m be any number such that m ≥ ρ0(A0). Let C be a
set of domain constants: C is allowed to have any cardinality. Let U be a restricted
theory bounded by m in the language of signature Θ+ C extending A0. The theory
U may have any complexity.
Consider any formula C(x). Let n := max(m, ρ0(C) + c10, ρ0(S) + c10).
If the theory U + {C(q) | q ∈ ω} is consistent, then the theory U + ∀x ∈ ℑn C(x)
is consistent.
Proof. We apply Theorem 3.3 to ∃x ∈ δN ¬C(x) and take the contraposition. ✷
4. A Conservativity Result
We can use the machinery we built up to prove a Lindstro¨m-style result on
conservative extensions.
Suppose U is a restricted, sequential, recursively enumerable theory with se-
quence scheme S. Let p be a bound for the complexity of the axioms of U . By
Craig’s trick, we can give a Σb1-axiomatization of U . Say the Σ
b
1-formula represent-
ing the axioms is η. Suppose A0 is a finite subtheory of U such that S makes A0
sequential. Clearly U can be axiomatized by
A0 + {η
N (q)→ truen(q) | q ∈ ω}.
This representation of the axiom set leads immediately to the following theorem.
Theorem 4.1. Suppose U is a restricted, sequential, recursively enumerable theory.
Consider any number m. Then there is a finitely axiomatized sequential theory A
in the same language that extends U and is ∆∗m-conservative over U .
Proof. By our above observations there is a finitely axiomatized sequential theory
A0 and a formula B(x) such that U can be axiomatized as A0 + {B(q) | q ∈ ω}.
Let n := max(ρ0(A0), ρ0(B) + c10,m+ c10, ρ0(S) + c10).
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We take A := A0 + ∀x ∈ ℑnB(x). We note that A is a finitely axiomatized
extension of U . Consider any C ∈ ∆∗m. Suppose U 0 C. Then, the theory
A0+{(B(q)∧¬C) | q ∈ ω} is consistent. It follows that A0+∀x ∈ ℑn (B(x)∧¬C)
is consistent. In other words, we find A 0 C. ✷
We have the following corollary.
Corollary 4.2. Suppose U is a restricted, sequential, recursively enumerable the-
ory. Suppose further that D is a finite extension of U such that U 0 D. Then,
there is a finite extension D′ of U , such that D ⊢ D′ but D′ 0 D.
Proof. Let m be a ρ0-bound on U and on D. Let A be the sentence promised in
Theorem 4.1 for ∆∗m. Let D
′ := D ∨ A. Clearly D ⊢ D′ and D′ ⊢ U . Suppose
D′ ⊢ D. Then, it follows that A ⊢ D, contradicting the ∆∗m-conservativity of A
over U . ✷
Since, as is well-known, the finitely axiomatized sequential theories in the signature
of U are dense w.r.t. ⊣, it follows that we can add to the statement of the Corollary
that U 0 D′: in case the D′ provided the theorem would happen to axiomatize U ,
we simply replace it by a D′′ strictly between the original D′ and D.
Here is one more corollary.
Corollary 4.3. Consider any finitely axiomatized, sequential theory A in signature
Θ. Suppose that for some of class of Θ-sentences Ω we have a definable predicate
TRUE such that, for any Ω-sentence B, we have A ⊢ B ↔ TRUE(pBq). Let X be
any recursively enumerable set of Ω-sentences. Then there is a finite extension A+
of A+X such that A+ is Ω-conservative over A+X.
Proof. Clearly A+{TRUE(B) | B ∈ X} is restricted. We apply Theorem 4.1 taking
m := ρ0(TRUE(x)) + 1. ✷
We give two examples of applications of the result.
Example 4.4. Let U be any recursively enumerable extension of PA. Then, there
is a finite extension A of ACA0 such that the arithmetical consequences of A are
precisely the consequences of U . Similarly for the pair ZF and GB.
This result was previously proven by Robert van Wesep in his paper [Wes13].
Example 4.5. By Parsons’ result IΣ1 is Π
0
2-conservative over PRA.
8 Since, over
EA, we have Σm-truth predicates. It follows that, for every m, we have an finite
extension Am of PRA that is Σm-conservative. We can easily arrange that these
extensions become strictly weaker when m grows.
We refer the reader to [PV18] for a number of results in the same niche using a
different methodogy.
5. Standardness Regained
Finiteness is Predicate Logic’s nemesis. However hard Predicate Logic tries,
there is no way it can pin down the set of standard numbers. What happens when
we invert the question? Are there theories that interpret some basic arithmetic that
do not have models in which the standard numbers are interpretable? The answer is
8We consider a version of PRA in the original arithmetical language here.
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a resounding yes. For example, PA+ incon(PA) has no models in which the standard
numbers are interpretable. More generally, consider any recursively enumerable
consistent theory U with signature Θ. Suppose the signature of arithmetic is Ξ.
Then, the theory U + {(
∧
(S12)
τ → inconτ (U)) | τ : Ξ → Θ} is consistent and
does not have any models that have an internal model isomorphic to the standard
numbers.9
The situation changes when we put some restriction on the complexity of the
axioms of the theory. The classical work concerning this idea the beautiful paper
by Kenneth McAloon [McA78]. McAloon shows that arithmetical theories with
axioms of restricted complexity that are consistent with PA always have a model in
which the standard integers are definable. McAloon’s work was further extended
by Zofia Adamowicz, Andre´s Cordo´n-Franco and Felix Lara-Mart´ın. See [ACL16].
Our aim in this paper is to find an analogue of McAloon’s Theorem that works
for all sequential theories. We prove a result that is more general in scope but, at
the same time, substantially weaker in its statement. We show that any consistent
restricted sequential theory U has a model in which the intersection of all definable
cuts is isomorphic to the standard natural numbers. This intersection is not gener-
ally itself definable in the model. We will show that the intersection of all definable
cuts is a good notion that, for sequential theories, is not dependent on the original
choice of the interpretation of number theory.
5.1. The Intersection of all Definable Cuts. In this subsection, we establish
that the intersection of all definable cuts is a good notion.
Consider a sequential model M. Let N be a M-internal model satisfying S12.
Let JM,N be the intersection of all M-definable N -cuts in M.
Now consider two M-internal models N and N ′ satisfying S12. By a result of
Pavel Pudla´k ([Pud85]), there is an M-definable isomorphism F between an M-
definable cut I of N and an M-definable cut I ′ of N ′. It is easily seen that F
restricted to JM,N is an isomorphism between JM,N and JM,N ′ .
Suppose G and H are twoM-definable partial functions between N and N ′ such
that the restrictions of G and H to JM,N commute with zero and successor. Then
it is easy to see that G and H are extensionally equal isomorphisms between JM,N
and JM,N ′ . Thus, in a sense, there is a unique definable isomorphism between
JM,N and JM,N ′ .
The above observations justify the notation JM for JM,N modulo isomorphism.
We note that, in the definition of JM it does not matter whether we allow
parameters in the definition of the cuts. Every cut with parameters has a parameter-
free shortening. Suppose I is an N -cut that is given by I(x,~b ). Then,
I∗(x) := ∀~y (cut({z | I(z, ~y )})→ I(x, ~y ))
defines a cut I∗ that is a shortening of I.
Remark 5.1. What happens if the sequence scheme S itself involves parameters?
In [Vis13], it is shown that these parameters can eliminated by raising the dimension
of the interpretation. Since the standard development of an interpretation of S12 in
a sequential theory does not involve parameters, it follows that even in a sequential
theory with a sequence scheme involving parameters, there is an interpretation of
9We assume that the axioms of identity are part of the axiomatization of S12.
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S12 that is parameter-free! However, the cost of this fact is that there may be no
such interpretation that is one-dimensional.
Before going on with the main line of our story, I want to give some basic facts
about JM in order to place it in perspective.
Theorem 5.2. Suppose M is a sequential model. We have:
JM |= EA+BΣ1 + {conn(A) | M |= A}.
Proof. Suppose N is, as before, the interpretation given by the sequence scheme S
that defines an internal S12-model of M. We will consider JM as the intersection
of all N -cuts. We again write ℑn for ℑSn(Θ).
Since there is an N -cut J such that on J we have W := I∆0 + Ω1 + BΣ1 and
since this property is downwards preserved, we find that JM |=W .
Suppose M |= A. Without loss of generality, we can assume that n ≥ ρ0(A).
Clearly, we have M |= conℑnn (A). Hence, by downwards persistence, JM |=
conn(A).
Finally, consider any a in JM. Consider any N -cut I. There is an N -cut I ′ such
that for every b in I ′, we have 2b is in I. Since a is in I ′, it follows that 2a is in I.
Since I was arbitrary, we have 2a is in JM. ✷
Let JU := Th({JM | M |= U}). Then, we have:
Corollary 5.3. JU ⊢ EA+ BΣ1 + ✵U .
The next theorem is a kind of overspill principle.
Theorem 5.4. Suppose M is a sequential model and M defines an internal S12-
model of M. We treat JM as the intersection of all M -cuts. Let B(x) be any
formula. We have:
(for all b in JM, M |= B(b)) iff, for some M -cut J , M |= ∀x ∈ J B(x).
Proof. The right-to-left direction is trivial. Suppose for all b in JM, we haveM |=
B(b). Let X := {x ∈ δM | ∀y <M xB(y)}. If X is closed under successor, then
we can shorten X to an M -cut J for which we have ∀x ∈ J B(x), and we are done.
Otherwise, there is a c such that ¬B(c) ∧ ∀y < cB(y). Since c cannot be in JM,
it follows that there is a cut J below c. ✷
Our overspill principle immediately gives:
Theorem 5.5. Suppose M is a sequential model and M defines an internal S12-
model of M. Let P be a Π1-formula. We have:
JM |= P iff, for some M -cut J , M |= P
J .
Corollary 5.6. Let P be a Π1-formula. Then, JU ⊢ P iff, for some M : S12 ✁ U ,
we have U ⊢ PM .
Proof. The proof of the corollary is by a simple compactness argument. ✷
Open Question 5.7. Any further information on JU would be interesting. For
example, what are the possible complexities of JU for recursively enumerable se-
quential theories U?
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5.2. ω-models. Before proceeding, we briefly reflect on the notion of ω-model. The
common practice is to say, e.g., that M is an ω-model of ZF if the von Neumann
numbers of M are (order-)isomorphic to ω. Of course, there are other interpreta-
tions M of arithmetic in ZF. However, we have the feature that if the M -numbers
are isomorphic to ω, then so are the von Neumann numbers —but not vice versa.
If we consider GB in stead of ZF we do not know whether this feature is preserved.
It is conceivable that, in some model, a definable cut of the von Neumann numbers
is isomorphic to ω and the von Neumann numbers are not.
It seems to me that the proper codification of the common practice would be to
say that an ω-model is not strictly a model but a pair 〈M,M〉 of a model and an
interpretation M of a suitable arithmetic in M such that M˜(M) is isomorphic to
ω.
Of course there is the option of existentially quantifying out the choice of the
interpretation of arithmetic. Let’s say that M is an e-ω-model, if for some M ,
〈M,M〉 is an ω-model.
Finally, in the sequential case, there is a third option. We define: a sequential
model M is an i-ω-model if JM is isomorphic to the standard numbers. (i stands
for: intersection.) In other words,M is an i-ω-model if, for some interpretation M
of S12, for every non-standard element a, there is anM-definableM -cut I such that
I < a.
We have the following property of i-ω-models.
Theorem 5.8. Suppose M is a sequential i-ω-model and M : S12 ✁M. Let X
be a parametrically definable class of M -numbers. Suppose ω ⊆ X. (We confuse
the standard part of M with ω.) Then there is a M-definable M -cut J such that
J ⊆ X.
Proof. Suppose ω ⊆ X . Consider the class Y := {a ∈ N | ∀b ≤ a b ∈ X}. In case
Y is closed under successor we can shorten it to a definable cut, and we are done.
In case Y is not closed under successor, there is an a0 such that ∀b ≤ a0 b ∈ X but
Sa0 6∈ X . By our assumption ω < a0. Hence there must be a definable cut I with
ω ≤ I < a0. So, I ⊆ X . ✷
5.3. The Main Result. If we are content with the countable case, our main result
is a simple application of the Omitting Types Theorem. We first give this easier
proof.
Theorem 5.9. Let U be a consistent restricted sequential theory. Here U may be
of any complexity. We allow countably many constants in U . Then, U has a model
M in which JM is isomorphic to the standard natural numbers.
Proof. We fix a sequence scheme S for U . We work with the interpretation N of
S12 provided by this scheme. Suppose that in all countable U -models the type
T (x) := {x 6= n | n ∈ ω} ∪ {x ∈ ℑn | n ∈ ω}
is realized. Then, by the Omitting Types Theorem, there is a formula A(x), such
that, for a fresh constant c, we have (i) U +A(c) is consistent and (ii) U +A(c) ⊢
c 6= n, for each n ∈ ω, and (iii) U +A(c) ⊢ c ∈ ℑn, for each n ∈ ω.
We apply Theorem 3.4 to (i) and (ii) obtaining that, for some n∗, the theory
U +A(c) + ∀x ∈ ℑn∗ c 6= x is consistent. However, this directly contradicts (i) and
(iii).
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We may conclude that there is a countable model M in which T (x) is omitted.
Clearly, this tells us that JM is isomorphic to the standard numbers. ✷
We proceed to prove the stronger version of our theorem where the restriction to
countability is lifted. We first prove a Lemma.
Lemma 5.10. Let M be any sequential model of signature Θ with domain M . Let
S be a sequence scheme for M. As usual, N is the interpretation of S12 given by
the sequence scheme.
Let k be any number. We note that the ρ0-complexity of the axioms of AS
+ is a
fixed number, say s. So the sequentiality of M is witnessed by the satisfaction of a
sentence D of complexity below s+ρ0(S). Let n := max(k, s+ρ0(S), 1+c10, ρ0(S)+
c10).
Then, M has a sequential ∆∗k-elementary extension K with sequence scheme S
such that ℑKn ∩M = ω.
Proof. Without loss of generality we may assume that k ≥ s + ρ0(S), so that
Th∆∗
k
(M) is sequential. Let Γ := Th∆∗
k
(M)(M). We claim that
Γ∗ := Γ + {ℑn < m | M |= m ∈ δN ∧ ω <
N m}
is consistent (for n as given in the statement of the Lemma). If not, then for some
nonstandard m0, . . . ,mℓ−1 in M , we have
Γ ⊢ m0 ∈ ℑn ∨ . . . ∨ mℓ−1 ∈ ℑn.
Let m be the minimum of the mi. We find Γ ⊢ m ∈ ℑn. On the other hand, the
theory Γ + 0 < m, 1 < m, . . . is consistent. Hence, by Theorem 3.4, we have that
Γ + ℑn < m is consistent. A contradiction.
Let K be a model of Γ∗. Clearly, in K, we have that ℑn is below all non-standard
elements inherited fromM (but, of course, not necessarily below new non-standard
elements). Also K is, by construction, a ∆∗n-elementary extension. Finally, since we
have chosen n ≥ s+ρ0(S), the model K is again sequential with the same sequence
scheme. ✷
With the Lemma in hand, we can now prove the promised theorem using a limit
construction.
Theorem 5.11. Let M be any sequential model. Then, for any k, M has a ∆∗k-
elementary extension K in which JK is (isomorphic to) ω.
Proof. Let S be a sequence scheme forM. We work with the numbers N provided
by this scheme. Let s be as in Lemma 5.10. We take:
• n0 := max(k, s+ ρ0(S)).
• nj+1 := max(ρ0(ℑj) + 1, s+ ρ0(S), 1 + c10, ρ0(S) + c10).
(We note that ρ0(ℑj) ≈ c0j + c9 and that for j > 0, we have nj+1 := ρ0(ℑj) + 1.)
We construct a chain of models Mi. Let M0 =M. Suppose we have constructed
Mj. We now take as Mj+1 a model that is a ∆∗nj+1 -elementary extension of Mj
such that ℑ
Mj+1
nj ∩Mj = ω.
Let K be the limit of (Mi)i∈ω . Consider any non-standard element a in N˜(K).
We have to show that there is a K-definable cut below it. Suppose a occurs inMj.
We have, by the construction of our sequence, that (†) ℑ
Mj+1
nj < a. By the fact
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that all Ms, with s > j + 1 are ∆∗nj+1 -elementary extensions of Mj+1, it follows
that (†) is preserved to the limit: ℑKnj+1 < a. ✷
From Theorem 5.11, we have immediately the desired strengthening of Theorem 5.9.
Theorem 5.12. Let U be a consistent restricted sequential theory. Here U may be
of any complexity. We allow a number of constants in U of any cardinality. Then
U has a model M in which JM is isomorphic to the standard natural numbers.
Remark 5.13. From Theorem 5.12, we retrace our steps and derive a less explicit
form of Theorem 3.4. Let U be a restricted sequential theory and consider any
C(x). Suppose V := U + {C(n) | n ∈ ω} is consistent. Let M be a model of V in
which JM is isomorphic to the standard natural numbers. By Theorem 5.8, there
is a definable M-cut J so that, in M, we have ∀x ∈ J C(x).
Now J is a definable cut in M, but it need not automatically be a cut in U .
There is a standard trick to remedy that. We define J◦ := J〈cut(J)〉N . Clearly, J◦
is a definable cut in U . Moreover, in the context ofM, the cuts J and J◦ coincide.
By the above considerations, it follows that U + ∀x ∈ J◦ Cx is consistent, where
J◦ is a U -definable cut.
Remark 5.14. Consider any model M. We define DEF(M) as the class of (para-
metrically) definable classes ofM. We define DEF−(M) as the class of classes over
M that are definable without parameters. Also, DEFn(M) is the class (parametri-
cally) definable n-ary relations and similarly for the parameter-free case.
It would seem that Theorem 5.11 gives us information about possible sequen-
tial models of the form 〈M,DEF(M)〉, since JM is definable in 〈M,DEF(M)〉.
However, this is not so, since we have a much stronger result for the models
〈M,DEF(M)〉, where M is sequential.
We assume that M has finite signature, where we may allow an infinity of
constants. In each model 〈M,DEF(M)〉, where M satisfies these demands, the
natural numbers are definable. The argument is simple. Let commx(X) mean
that X satisfies the commutation conditions for satisfaction of ∆∗x-formulas in JM.
Consider, in 〈M,DEF(M)〉 the class Y := {x ∈ N | ∃X commx(X)}. Clearly, each
standard x is in Y . If a non-standard number b would be in Y , the defining formula
for the witnessing X would violate Tarski’s Theorem of the undefinability of truth
for M.10
If the sequence scheme for M is parameter-free, then the same argument works
for 〈M,DEF−(M)〉. If the sequence scheme contains parameters, we can make the
argument work for 〈M,DEF−n (M)〉, for sufficiently large n.
Finally, note that ifM is a non-standard model of Peano Arithmetic, then JM is
simply isomorphic toM itself. Thus, adding JM (viewed as intersection of all cuts
on the identical interpretation of S12) to M does not increase the expressiveness of
the language. This consideration shows that adding the definable sets can be more
expressive than adding JM (as intersection of the cuts for a given interpretation of
S12).
6. Reflection
If we apply Theorem 3.3 to a formula of a special form, we get a reflection
principle.
10Ali Enayat tells me that the basic idea of this argument is originally due to Mostowski.
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Theorem 6.1. Consider any consistent, restricted, sequential theory U with se-
quence scheme S. Let N be the interpretation of the numbers provided by S. Let m0
be the bound for U and let m1 be any number. Let n := max(m0,m1+ρ0(S)+ c10).
Then, for every Σ2-sentence C of the form C = ∃xC0(x), where C0 is Π1 and
ρ0(C) ≤ m1, we have: if U ⊢ ∃x ∈ ℑn C
N
0 (x), then C is true.
Proof. Under the assumptions of the theorem, we suppose U ⊢ ∃x ∈ ℑn CN0 (x). By
Theorem 3.3, there is a k such that U ⊢
∨
q≤k C
N
0 (q). Suppose C is false. Then,
for each q ≤ k, we have ¬C0(q). Hence, by Σ1-completeness, for each q ≤ k, we
have U ⊢ ¬CN0 (q). It follows that U ⊢ ⊥. Quod non. ✷
We note that the above proof uses Σ01-collection in the metalanguage.
If we take the formulas still simpler we can improve the above result. We fix a
logarithmic cut S12-cut J˜ . There is a Σ1-truth predicate, say True, for Σ1-sentences,
such that, for any Σ1-sentence S, we have S
1
2 ⊢ True(S) → S and S
1
2 ⊢ S
J˜ →
True(S). (See e.g. [HP93], Part V, Chapter 5b for details.)
Theorem 6.2. Consider any consistent, restricted, sequential theory U with se-
quence scheme S and bound m. Let n := max(m, ρ0(True(x)) + ρ0(S) + c10 + 1).
For all Σ1-sentences S, we have: if U ⊢ SJ˜
ℑn , then S is true.
Proof. We have:
U ⊢ SJ˜ℑn ⇒ U ⊢ Trueℑn(S)
⇒ True(S) is true
⇒ S is true.
The second step is by theorem 6.1. ✷
7. Degrees of Interpretability
In this section, we apply our results to study the joint degree structure of local
and global interpretability for recursively enumerable sequential theories. The main
result of this section is a characterization of finite axiomatizability in terms of
the double degree structure. We will study the degree structures as partial pre-
orderings.
7.1. The Basic Idea. The degree structures we are interested in are the degrees of
global interpretability of recursively enumerable sequential theories Globseq and the
degrees of local interpretability of recursively enumerable sequential theories Locseq.
It is well known that both structures are distributive lattices. We have the obvious
projection functor π from Globseq onto Locseq.
Let Fin be the property of global degrees of containing a finitely axiomatized
theory. What we want to show is that, if we start with the pair Globseq and Locseq
and with the projection π, then we can define Fin (using a first-order formula).
The basic idea is simple. Zoom in on a local degree of U . This degree contains a
distributive lattice, say, L of global degrees. The lattice L has a maximum, to wit
✵U . Does it have a minimum? Well, if there is a finitely axiomatized theory U0 in
L, then its global degree will automatically be the minimum. We will see that (i)
not in all cases a minimum degree of L exists and (ii) if such a minimum exists it
contains a finitely axiomatizable theory. In other words, the mapping φ with:
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φ(U)✁glob V ⇔ U ✁loc π(V )
is partial. However, if it has a value, this value contains a finitely axiomatized
theory. So, we can define: fin(U) iff, for all V , we have U ✁glob V iff π(U)✁loc π(V ).
Open Question 7.1. Can we define fin in Globseq alone?
Remark 7.2. In the context of local degrees of arbitrary theories with arbitrarily
large signatures, Mycielski, Pudla´k and Stern charactarize loc-finite as the same
as compact in terms of the ✁loc-ordering. This will not work in our context of
global interpretability and recursively enumerable sequential theories. We briefly
give the argument that, in our context, every non-minimal globally finite degree is
non-compact.
Let A be any ✁-non-minimal, finitely axiomatized, sequential theory. Let Bi be
a enumeration of all finitely axiomatized sequential theories. Let C0 := S
1
2, We note
that, by our assumption, C0 ✁6= A. Let Cn+1 := Bn if Cn ✁6= Bn ✁6= A and Cn+1 := Cn
otherwise. Clearly, A✄Ci, for all i. Consider any sequential recursively enumerable
theory U such that U ✄ Ci, for all i. Without loss of generality, we may assume
that the signatures of U and A are disjoint. We easily see that the theory U∗
axiomatized by {(D ∨ A) | D is an axiom of U} is the infimum in the degrees of
global interpretability of U and A. So Ci ✁U
∗
✁A. Suppose U∗ ✁
6=
A. In this case,
by [Vis17, Theorem 5.3], we can find a finitely axiomatized sequential B such that
U∗ ✁
6=
B ✁
6=
A. let B = Bj . Since Cj ✁ U
∗
✁
6=
B ✁
6=
A, we will have Cj+1 := Bj . A
contradiction. It follows that U∗ ≡ A. We may conclude that A✁ U . So, A is the
supremum of the Ci. Clearly, A cannot be the supremum of a finite number of the
Ci. Thus, A is not compact.
7.2. Preliminaries. We consider the recursively enumerable theory U . By Craig’s
Theorem, we can give U a Σb1-definable axiomatization X . Let this axiomatization
is given by a Σb1-formula η. We define U↾n as the theory axiomatized by the axioms
of U , as given by η that are ≤ n.
An important functor is ✵. We define: ✵U := S
1
2 + {conn(U↾n) | n ∈ ω}. We
note that ✵U is extensionally independent of the choice of η.
One can show that ✵ is the right adjoint of π:
U ✁glob ✵V ⇔ π(U)✁loc V.
See e.g. [Vis11a] or [Vis17].
A theory is glob-finite iff it is mutually globally interpretable with a finitely
axiomatized theory. A theory is loc-finite iff it is mutually locally interpretable
with a finitely axiomatized theory. If we enrich Globseq with a predicate Fin for the
globally finite degrees, we have a first-order definition of Locseq over this structure
as follows:
U ✁loc V ⇔ ∀A ∈ Fin (A✁glob U ⇒ A✁glob V ).
Here is a first basic insight.
Theorem 7.3. The theory U is a-finite, for a ∈ {glob, loc}, iff U ≡a U↾n, for
some n.
Proof. Suppose U ≡a V , where V is finitely axiomatized. Clearly, U↾n ✄ V , for
some n. We have: U ⊇ U↾n ✄ V ✄a U , and we are done. ✷
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loc-finite glob-finite fin. axiom.
GB + + +
I∆0, S2 + + ?
GB◦ + + −
✵GB + − −
PA − − −
Figure 1. Separating Sequential Local and Global Finiteness
7.3. Some Examples. Before formulating and proving our main result, we briefly
pause to provide a few examples.
Example 7.4. The theories I∆0 and S2 = I∆0 + Ω1 are examples of theories of
which the finite axiomatizability is an open problem, but which are, by an argument
of Alex Wilkie, glob-finite. They are, for example, mutually interpretable with
the finitely axiomatized sequential theory AS and with the finitely axiomatized
sequential theory PA−.
We show that any global, recursively enumerable, sequential degree contains an
element that is not finitely axiomatizable.
Theorem 7.5. Consider any consistent, sequential, recursively enumerable theory
U . Then there is a U◦ ≡ U such that U◦ is sequential and recursively enumerable
and not finitely axiomatizable.
Proof. Consider a consistent, sequential and recursively enumerable theory U . In
case U is not finitely axiomatizable, we are done, taking U◦ := U . Suppose U is
finitely axiomatizable, say by a single sentence A. Par abus de langage, we write A
also for the theory axiomatized by x = pAq.
By Theorem 6.2, we can find M : S12 ✁A for which A is Σ
0
1-sound. Consider:
U◦ := A+ {(con(A)→ conn+1(A))M | n ∈ ω}.
We have, by Feferman’s version of the Second Incompleteness Theorem:
A ⊆ U◦ ⊆ (A+ inconM (A))✁A.
So U◦ ≡ A. Suppose U◦ were finitely axiomatizable. Then, we would have, for
some n > 0,
A+ (con(A)→ conn(A))M ⊢ (con(A)→ conn+1(A))M .
Hence A ⊢ (✷n+1A ⊥ → ✷
n
A⊥)
M . So, by Lo¨b’s Theorem, A ⊢ (✷nA⊥)
M , contradicting
the Σ01-soundness of A w.r.t. M . ✷
Here is a sufficient condition for failure to be loc-finite. We define:
• ✵+U := S
1
2 + {con(U ↾ n) | n ∈ ω}.
Here U ↾ n is defined with respect to a chosen Σb1-formula η that represents
the axiom set of U .
We call U strongly loc-reflexive if U ✄✵+U . We note that e.g. PRA is an example of
a strongly loc-reflexive theory.
Theorem 7.6. Suppose that U is strongly loc-reflexive. Then, U is not loc-finite.
SMALL IS VERY SMALL 29
Proof. Suppose U ✄loc ✵
+
U . Suppose, to obtain a contradiction, that U is loc-
finite. Then, for some i, we have U↾i ✄loc U . Moreover, U ✄ (S
1
2 + con(U↾i)). So,
U↾i✄ (S12 + con(U↾i)), contradicting the second incompleteness theorem. ✷
7.4. Characterizations. The following characterization of loc-finiteness may look
like an obscurum per obscurius. However, it is a central tool in what follows.
Theorem 7.7. Suppose U is sequential. The variable I will range over S12-definable
cuts. The following are equivalent:
1. U is loc-finite.
2. ∃i ∀j≥i ∃I S12 + coni(U↾i) ⊢ con
I
j (U↾j).
3. ∃i ∀j≥i ∃I S12 + conj(U↾j) ⊢ con
I
j+1(U↾(j + 1)).
Proof. (1) ⇒ (2). Suppose U is loc-finite. Then, U↾i ✄loc U , for some i. Consider
any j ≥ i. For some M , we have M : U↾i✄ U↾j. Using M , we can transform a
U↾j, j-inconsistency proof into an U↾i, k-inconsistency proof, for a sufficiently large
k. Thus, we have S12 ⊢ conk(U↾i) → conj(U↾j). On the other hand, for some I,
S12 + coni(U↾i) ⊢ con
I
k(U↾i). This last step can be seen, e.g. from the fact that
a cut-elimination that transforms a k-proof to an i-proof is multi-exponential (see
[Bus15]).11 It suffices to take as I an appropriate multi-logarithmic cut. We may
conclude that S12 + coni(U↾i) ⊢ con
I
j (U↾j).
(2)⇒ (3) and (3)⇒ (2) are trivial.
For (2)⇒ (1), one shows that, for i as promised, S12+ coni(U↾i) is mutually locally
interpretable with U . ✷
We note that in the above proof, the precise point where where sequentiality is
used, is the insight that U interprets S12+ coni(U↾i). Thus, only (2)⇒ (1) depends
on sequentiality.12
By a result of Wilkie and Paris ([WP87], see also [Vis11a]), we have, for Σ1-sentences
P and Q, that EA+ P ⊢ Q iff, for some S12-cut I, we have S
1
2 + P ⊢ Q
I . Hence, it
follows that:
Corollary 7.8. Suppose U is sequential. The following are equivalent:
1. U is loc-finite.
2. ∃i ∀j≥i EA+ coni(U) ⊢ conj(U).
3. ∃i ∀j≥i EA+ conj(U) ⊢ conj+1(U).
7.5. The Main Theorem. Consider the partial preorder, say L, of sequential
degrees of global interpretability contained in a given degree of local sequential
interpretability. Note that L is closed under suprema and infima. Suppose our
given local degree is not loc-finite. Then, L does not have a minimum. This insight
is formulated in the following theorem.
Theorem 7.9. Suppose that U is a recursively enumerable, sequential theory that
is not loc-finite. Then, there is a theory U˜ , such that U˜ ≡loc U , but U˜ 6✄glob U .
11Alternatively, we can prove the step by a combination of the Interpretation Existence Lemma
([Vis17]) and the local reflexiveness of U↾i that is a direct consequence of Theorem 2.17 of the
present paper.
12This is not true anymore when we employ the argument of Footnote 11.
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Proof. Suppose that U is recursively enumerable, sequential and not loc-finite. Let
the signature of U be Θ and let a sequence scheme for U be S. As usual N is
the standard interpretation of S12 in U given by S. We write ℑi for ℑ
S
i (Θ). The
complexities of the ℑi are estimated by c0i+ c9 + ρ0(S). Taking c11 := c9 + ρ0(S),
our estimate becomes: c0i+ c11. By the choice of the ℑi we have: U ⊢ con
ℑi
i (U↾i).
Consider S12. Say the signature of S
1
2 is Ξ and a sequence scheme that interprets
the numbers identically is T . We write Ii for ℑTi (Ξ). The complexities of the Ii
are estimated by c0i+ c9+ρ0(T ). Taking c12 := c9 +ρ0(T ), our estimate becomes:
c0i+ c12.
We define the theory U˜ as follows: Let Let F (i) := (c0 + 1)i+ 1.
13
U˜ := S12 + {con
IF (i)
i (U↾i) | i ∈ ω}.
Clearly, U˜ ≡loc U .
Suppose, to obtain a contradiction, that, for some K, we have K : U˜ ✄ U . By
Pudla´k’s theorem ([Pud85]), there is a U˜ -cut J of N and a U˜ -cut J ′ of K ◦N and a
U˜ -definable isomorphism G between J and J ′. We define Ji := G
−1[ℑKi ∩ J
′]. We
clearly have: Ji is a U˜ -cut and U˜ ⊢ con
Ji
i (U). We note that:
x ∈ Ji :↔ ∃y (Gxy ∧ (y ∈ ℑi)
K ∧ y ∈ J ′),
so that ρ0(Ji) is estimated by a linear term of the form c0i + c13. (Here c13 is
dependent on ρ0(K).)
Consider any s. We will make s more specific in the run of the argument. We have:
U˜ ⊢ con
Js+1
s+1 (U↾(s+ 1)). Hence, by compactness, for some p ≥ s:
(1) S12+ {con
IF (i)
i (U↾i) | i ≤ s}+ {con
IF(j)
j (U↾j) | s < j ≤ p} ⊢ con
Js+1
s+1 (U↾(s+1))
Thus, it follows that:
(2) S12 + cons(U↾s) + incon
Js+1
s+1 (U↾(s+ 1)) ⊢ incon
IF (s+1)
p (U↾p)
Since, U is not loc-finite, we have, by Theorem 7.7, arbitrarily large s’s such that
As := S
1
2 + cons(U↾s) + incon
Js+1
s+1 (U↾(s+ 1)) is consistent. We note that ρ0(As) is
estimated by c0s+ c14 for a suitable c14.
Consider any s for which As is consistent. We remind the reader of Theorem 6.1.
Applied to the case at hand this tells us the following. Let n := max(ρ0(As), c15)
(where c15 is a fixed constant). Then, if As ⊢ incon
In
p (U↾p), then inconp(U↾p) is
true. Since we assumed that U is consistent, it follows that As 0 incon
In
p (U↾p).
We note that n is estimated by c0s + c16 for a suitable c16. We may choose s
large enough so that F (s+1) > c0s+ c16 and such that As is consistent. It follows
that IF (s+1) is a subcut of In. Since, by Equation (2), As ⊢ incon
IF (s+1)
p (U↾p), it
follows that As ⊢ incon
In
p (U↾p). A contradiction. ✷
Note that Theorem 7.9 implies that any local sequential degree that is not loc-finite
contains an infinity of global degrees.
13It is a sport to take the choice of F as sharp as possible. The argument below becomes a bit
more relax if we take F (i) := i2 + 1 and just keep track of linear dependencies.
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Open Question 7.10. Every element of Locseq contains an extension of S
1
2 (to wit
an element of the form ✵U ). Does every element of Globseq contain an extension of
S12?
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Appendix A. Parameters
In general, interpretations are allowed to have parameters. We will briefly sketch
how to add parameters to our framework. We first define a translation with param-
eters. The parameters of the translation are given by a fixed sequence of variables ~w
that we keep apart from all other variables. A translation is defined as before, but
for the fact that now the variables ~w are allowed to occur in the domain-formula
and in the translations of the predicate symbols in addition to the variables that
correspond to the argument places. Officially, we represent a translation τ~w with
parameters ~w as a quintuple 〈Σ, δ, ~w, F,Θ〉. The parameter sequence may be empty:
in this case our interpretation is parameter-free.
An interpretation with parameters K : U → V is a quadruple 〈U, π,E, τ~w, V 〉,
where τ~w : ΣU → ΣV is a translation and π is a V -formula containing at most ~w
free. The formula π represents the parameter domain. For example, if we interpret
the Hyperbolic Plane in the Euclidean Plane via the Poincare´ interpretation, we
need two distinct points to define a circular disk. These points are parameters
of the construction, the parameter domain is π(w0, w1) = (w0 6= w1). (For this
specific example, we can also find a parameter-free interpretation.) The formula
E represents an equivalence relation on the parameter domain. In practice this is
always pointwise identity for parameter sequences, but for reasons of theory one
must admit other equivalence relations too. We demand:
• ⊢ δτ, ~w(~v)→ π(~w),
• ⊢ Pτ, ~w(~v0, . . . , ~vn−1)→ π(~w).
• V ⊢ ∃~w π(~w);
• V ⊢ E(~w, ~z)→ (π(~w) ∧ π(~z));
• V proves that E represents an equivalence relation on the sequences forming
the parameter domain;
• ⊢ E(~w, ~z)→ ∀~x (δτ, ~w(~x)↔ δτ,~z(~x));
• ⊢ E(~w, ~z)→ ∀~x0, . . . , ~xn−1 (Pτ, ~w(~x0, . . . , ~xn−1)↔ Pτ,~z(~x0, . . . , ~xn−1));
• for all U -axioms A, V ⊢ ∀~w (π(~w)→ Aτ, ~w).
We can lift the various operations in the obvious way. Note that the parameter
domain of N :=M ◦K and the corresponding equivalence relation should be:
• πN (~w, ~u0, . . . , ~uk−1) := πM (~w) ∧
∧
i<k δτM (~w, ~ui) ∧ (πK(~u))
τM , ~w.
• EN (~w, ~u0, . . . , ~uk−1, ~z, ~v0, . . . , ~vk−1) :=
EM (~w, ~z) ∧
∧
i<k δτM (~w, ~ui) ∧
∧
i<k δτM (~w,~vi) ∧ (EK(~u,~v))
τM , ~w.
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